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HOW DO YOU LEARN FROM A RIVER? MANAGING
UNCERTAINTY IN SPECIES CONSERVATION POLICY
John M. Volkman*
Abstract: As the Puget Sound region embarks on a new chapter in the story of the
Endangered Species Act, experiences with fish and wildlife restoration efforts in other
locations can be instructive. This Article reviews conservation efforts in the Columbia River
Basin, and it explains the major role that scientific uncertainty plays in salmon conservation
efforts. This discussion describes the debate between traditional fish and wildlife
management, which focuses more on individual populations and mitigation technologies, and
recent scientific reports, which urge more reliance on naturally functioning rivers and
watersheds. The Article also describes a variety of learning tools that have helped in
managing the scientific uncertainty that this debate reflects. These tools stem from an idea
called adaptive management, a way of learning from experience. The tools now include
initiatives in applied research, collaborative modeling, independent scientific advice, and
ecological syntheses that shape policy development. Some of the insights this work has
generated, particularly the importance of building conservation programs around natural
processes and population structures, offer substantive guidance for other salmon recovery
efforts. This Article concludes that furthering collaboration between science and policy will
play a major role in the success of species conservation programs, but ecosystem-scale
experimentation is a puzzle that still needs a solution.
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INTRODUCTION

Species conservation in the Pacific Northwest has come to a new
crossroads. With the listing of Puget Sound and Willamette River salmon
under the Endangered Species Act, cities such as Seattle, Washington,
and Portland, Oregon, are sharing habitat with listed species and joining
other parts of the Northwest in a complex species conservation debate.
These communities are faced with learning a new landscape-not just a
new law, but the complex connections between humans and other species
in large ecosystems. The lack of recognizable landmarks in this new
terrain is likely to be an unwelcome surprise.
In many cases we have years of experience working with these
problems,1 and the Columbia River experience in salmon recovery is
1. Conflict over declining salmon runs is old news in the Puget Sound region. Bruce Brown's
book, Mountain in the Clouds: A Search for the Wild Salmon (1995), evokes the decline of wild
salmon in western Washington and the role of habitat destruction, fish hatcheries, and fisheries
management in contributing to the decline. Puget Sound was a primary arena for the Indian treaty
fishing conflicts of the 1960s. The struggle led to Judge Boldt's landmark decision in phase one of
United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 342 (W.D. Wash. 1974), guaranteeing the Puget
Sound tribes an equitable opportunity to fish. Phase two of United States v. Washington, 506
F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980), was less conclusive and involved claims to environmental
protection for salmon. See generally Fay G. Cohen, Treaties on Trial: The ContinuingControversy
over Northwest Indian FishingRights (1986); Felix Cohen's Handbook of FederalIndian Law 441
(Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982); Charles F. Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian: Land
Water, and the Future ofthe West (1992). Parties to the Puget Sound salmon conflicts have also put
together some of the more creative efforts to settle these controversies collaboratively. See Kai N.
Lee, Compass and Gyroscope: Integrating Science and Politics for the Environment 120-24
(1993) [hereinafter Compass and Gyroscope]; Cindy L. Halbert & Kai N. Lee, The Timber, Fish,
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particularly instructive for its efforts to manage scientific uncertainty in
conservation policy. Columbia River salmon have been in decline since
the early part of the century. Beginning in the 1960s, the declines spurred
major shifts in the way government dealt with salmon issues. The
declines have fueled Indian treaty-fishing litigation, threatened the
region's energy supply, and spawned a battery of remedial statutes,
international treaties, and court settlements. Taken together, the
Columbia River remedial programs constitute what two commentators
called the "most ambitious and costly effort at biological restoration on

the planet."2 Yet, in the early 1990s, Columbia River salmon were listed
under the Endangered Species Act, and there is "profound uncertainty

about the solutions."3 Part of the Columbia River story is that of

institutions coming to grips with these uncertainties. The Columbia River
effort has involved Indian tribes, states, federal agencies, interest groups,
and the Northwest Power Planning Council, an interstate entity.4 The
effort has generated programs that are complex and well financed. These
programs blend planning, negotiation, and litigation. They have a

considerable body of law to support them, including the full weight of

the Endangered Species Act.5 Yet not only are many Columbia River
wild salmon headed for extinction, the idea that any instrumentality of
government can navigate a sensible course through these problems is

increasingly in question. So, while the Columbia River has the jump on
the Puget Sound region when it comes to working with the Endangered

and Wildlife Agreement: Implementing Alternative Dispute Resolution in Washington State, 6
Northwest Envtl. J. 139 (1990).
2. Kai N. Lee & Jody Lawrence, Adaptive Management: Learningfrom the Columbia River Basin
Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 Envtl. L. 431, 433 (1986) (footnote omitted). For background on the
remedial legislation and the Indian treaty fishing cases, see Charles F. Wilkinson & Daniel Keith
Conner, The Law of the Pacific Salmon Fishery: Conservation and Allocation of a Transboundary
Common Property Resource, 32 U. Kan. L. Rev. 17, 46-51 (1983), and Michael C. Blumm, Why
Study PacificSalmon Law?, 22 Idaho L. Rev. 629 (1986).
3. American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., Civ. No. 96-00384-MA, slip op. at 14 (D.
Or. Apr. 3, 1997) (quoting William Stelle, Jr., Regional Director of National Marine Fisheries
Service).
4. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1994). See generally Michael C. Blumm, The Northwest's
Hydroelectric Heritage: Prologue to the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and
Conservation Act, 58 Wash. L. Rev. 175 (1983); Roy Hemmingway, The Northwest Power Planning
Council: Its Origins and FutureRole, 13 Envtl. L. 673 (1983); Kai N. Lee, The Path Along the
Ridge: RegionalPlanningin the Face of Uncertainty,58 Wash. L. Rev. 317 (1983).
5. See John M. Vollkman, The EndangeredSpecies Act and the Ecosystem of Columbia River
Salmon, 4 Hastings West-Northwest . Envtl. L. & Pol'y 51 (1997).
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Species Act, the Columbia has an equally dark theme-vanishing wild
salmon species.
This lack of success in halting species declines begs scientific
attention. Why, with these significant conservation efforts, are wild
species still declining? Are we aiming at the wrong problems? Are we
linking effects with the wrong causes? Are remedial efforts, no matter
how intensive, simply unable to keep pace with human development? To
what extent are species declines related to climatic or oceanic changes
over which regions like the Northwest have little control? If we do not
yet have the answers to these questions, how can we begin to find them?
This Article analyzes the Columbia River experience in building
collaborative relationships among policy makers and scientists to address
these uncertainties. Part II surveys uncertainties in species conservation
policy, historic approaches to fish and wildlife management, and the
effect of the Endangered Species Act on the Columbia River debate. Part
II also describes two landmark reports on the conservation of Pacific
salmon and how these reports have pushed the Columbia River effort to a
broader ecological plane. Part III explains an initiative called adaptive
management-a way of collaboratively managing uncertainty in
conservation policy-and the Columbia River parties' experience in
implementing it. Part IV concludes that this type of collaboration is not
just a compelling idea, but that only a productive, long-term interplay
between science and policy can spell success in species conservation.

6. The experience of vanishing species is not unique to the Columbia River and Puget Sound. In
1988, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that only five of 650 species listed under
the Endangered Species Act had recovered with about the same number of extinctions. See U.S.
Gen. Accounting Office, Endangered Species Act: Management Improvements Could Enhance
Recovery Program 18 (1988). Moreover, some of the "recoveries" were due to the discovery of
additional animals rather than to recovery efforts. For the bulk of listed species, the Act apparently
succeeded only in stabilizing a downward trend. See Timothy H. Tear et al., Status and Prospectsfor
Success of the EndangeredSpecies Act: A Look at Recovery Plans, 262 Science 976, 977 (1993)
(reporting that recovery plans generally aim for lesser objective than regulatory definition of
recovery); Fish & Wildlife Serv., U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Report to Congress: Endangeredand
Threatened Species Recovery Program 3 (1990) (observing that while "there can be successes in
recovery, removal from the list is not a reasonable goal for all endangered species"). If the objective
is long-term species recovery and conservation, federal agencies administering the Endangered
Species Act are also feeling their way toward a complex solution that will involve far more than the
Endangered Species Act.

Managing Uncertainty
II.

BACKGROUND

The science of ecology attempts to bring scientific knowledge and
methods to bear on complex problems that transcend the bounds of
traditional scientific disciplines. While ecological science is an
invaluable tool in managing these problems, it cannot produce precise
answers to many questions in species conservation policy, and the result
is large areas of uncertainty. But uncertainty does not have to lead to
helplessness if it is guided by a coherent, albeit general, understanding of
the relevant ecological landscape. Recent scientific reports portray the
need for more naturally functioning watersheds rather than the
fragmented mitigation programs that have characterized fish and wildlife
management up to this point.
A.

Uncertainty

Even people aware of the problem of shrinking biodiversity are likely
to be surprised by how much scientific uncertainty there is in species
conservation policy. Ecological science, the science that studies the
connection between plants, animals, land, water, light, and other
factors-all of the things that make up ecosystems-is indispensable to
species conservation policy because it attempts to integrate scientific
knowledge across species and landscapes. However, it is a much less
exact thing than the word "science' sometimes implies. Although
ecosystem science has substantial capabilities, it is a far cry from
Newtonian physics, and is perhaps closer to atmospheric science or
economics, which also deal with complex integrated systems. All "are
sciences of immense practical importance, and.., show their value
primarily through broad-brush analysis, illustration of mechanisms, and
short-term predictions. "'
Ecology's lack of resolution is characteristic of our knowledge of
salmon and salmon ecosystems. We do not understand salmon very well.
In many cases we do not know what role ecological factors play in their
migration, and we cannot pin down the precise ecological mechanisms
that have evidently been pushed out of kilter by development. Moreover,
the unusually large migratory range of the species amplifies the scale of
our uncertainty. A salmon that migrates from the interior mountains of

7. William M. Lewis, Jr., The EcologicalSciences and the PublicDomain, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev.
279,290 (1994).
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Idaho, down the Snake and Columbia Rivers to the Pacific Ocean, north
to Alaska, and back to its natal stream encounters an enormous collection
of influences, some of them quite obscure. Salmon spend most of their
lives in the ocean, where conditions change from year to year and decade
to decade. Because of the ocean's enormous size and complexity, and
because these changes in ocean conditions occur over such long time
periods, the ocean is something about which we know very little and the
problem of evaluating cause and effect is especially complex. Each of
these influences individually may affect salmon, and all of them
together-from the headwaters to the ocean--can have an immense
influence. But it is difficult to tie a particular effect (such as salmon
survival) to a particular cause (such as a mitigation effort) when these
influences are so diverse and undifferentiated.
While this Article is concerned with uncertainty, a caveat is
warranted. It is true that there are many things affecting species
conservation about which we know too little, and in some respects our
ignorance is remarkably deep. However, ecosystems are not just teeming
masses of incalculability. Things are known, and in some ways the
uncertainty in this area is no greater than the uncertainty that pervades
other parts of life. If certainty as to consequences were required, the
nation would never have agreed to such an open-ended document as the
Constitution, the White House would still be mulling over the purchase
of the Louisiana Territory, and Congress would be waiting for more
detailed hydrographic maps before opening the West to settlement.
Almost all aspects of human endeavor, certainly economics, defense, and
social policy, involve big unknowns in a world that will not wait for
certainty. In many instances, we proceed in the face of uncertainty with
the assumption that we know well enough what we are doing and can
learn more as we go along. This Article, then, is a divided counsel:
uncertainty is real, it is inescapable, and it should be planned for, but it
should not be used as an excuse for avoiding decisions!

8. The National Research Council has made the point in relation to Pacific salmon:
[There is a] great deal of knowledge that has been obtained about salmon-clearly enough to
substantially improve their prospects for survival if applied wisely. Such information should be
used to the fullest extent possible in implementation of projects, watershed planning, and other
programs designed to assist the survival and sustainability of salmon. To simply wait for new
research, new ideas, and new technology while continuing past practices that have adversely
affected anadromous salmon is a mistake. Such a delay only serves to increase the demise of
salmon and their ecosystems.

Managing Uncertainty
B.

Nineteenth-Century Species Managementand the Separation of
Speciesfrom NaturalInfluences

The nineteenth-century hatchery system is an example of how many
nineteenth-century fish and wildlife managers tended to see inroads on
fish and wildlife as individual problems with individual solutions. As
development destroyed habitat and people overharvested fish, managers
proposed using hatcheries to compensate for the damage.9 Hatcheries
grow salmon from eggs in a protected environment and then release the
hatched salmon into rivers where the salmon migrate to the sea. Early
fishery scientists had broad ideas about the "plasticity" of salmon,
misconceptions about salmon life histories, and ambitious expectations
about human ability to improve on what was viewed as a wasteful natural
world. ° Fishery managers thought that hatcheries could substitute for
lost habitat and also support greater harvests." Fishermen would have to
save only enough adult fish to supply eggs to the hatchery-far fewer
than the number of adults needed to spawn in a harsh and deteriorating
natural environment. Hatcheries also appealed to policy makers. 2
Hatcheries allowed them to defer difficult political and economic
choices. 3 Instead of being forced to choose between fish and
development, they could have both. Hatcheries served the interests of
fish and wildlife managers, fishermen, and developers. The seeds of this
wedding of interests were sown in the nineteenth-century, but the
relationship grew throughout much of this century and still persists
today, even in the face of controversy. 4
National Research Council, Upstream: Salmon and Society in the Pacific Northwest 348 (1996)
[hereinafter Upstream].
9. See Joseph E. Taylor, Making Salmon: Economy, Culture and Science in the Oregon Fisheries,
Precontact to 1960 at 107-19 (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Wash.) (on file with
University of Washington Library); see also Upstream, supra note 8, at 50.
10. See Taylor, supra note 9, at 125-26.
11. See id. at 107; see also Independent Scientific Group, Return to the River: Restoration of
Salmonid Fishes in the Columbia River Ecosystem 378, 388 (prepublication copy Sept. 10, 1996)
[hereinafter Return to the River].
12. See Taylor, supra note 9, at 151, 156.
13. See id. at 151.
14. Who is to say this was an unreasonable bargain? If the primary alternative is a resource policy
based more closely on the character of the land, the 19th century offers another cautionary example.
John Wesley Powell's irrigation survey proposed to evaluate local hydrologic conditions in the
West, identify the best irrigation sites, and provide a hydrologically rational basis for western
development. The idea gained momentum within the government, but when it began actually to
block development, there was a "perfect storm of indignation" and Congress squashed it. California
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This mechanistic perspective was not limited to the hatchery system.
During the 1950s, there was a major congressional debate whether to
build any more dams on the Snake River or its tributaries. In addition to
expressing confidence in "fish farming," proponents of dam development
argued that dams, properly configured, would actually help make the
river more productive:
We oppose S. 2586 on the grounds that it is too drastic and that it is
premised on the pessimistic assumption that the problem of fish
passage at high dams will never be solved.
We especially oppose section 2 which prohibits any dam which
would flood "established spawning grounds." This is an absolute
prohibition of all dams.
This provision alone is highly unreasonable and extreme since a
new reservoir almost invariably has more shoreline and is more
likely to provide new and more extensive shallow spawning waters
than can be expected in the narrow, rock cradle of the turbulent,
highly fluctuating Salmon River.
The Salmon River is far from being a perfect stream for raising
fish. It is a flooder, with extremes of flow at White Bird ranging
from 1,580 second-feet in December 1932 to 120,000 second-feet
in June 1894. This is a range or erratic ratio of 76 to 1. Man should
certainly be able to improve this reckless river into a better habitat
for salmon. 5
The premise for the mechanistic view of rivers was the idea that
natural systems were the sum of known parts that could be "improved."
Development could carve up natural systems, lose some parts, replace
others with technological surrogates, and the system would still work,
maybe even better. In the Snake River Basin, dams were built, and
hatchery programs were created. However, the problem of fish passage at

v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 659 (1978) (quoting 29 Cong. Rec. 1955 (1897)). Even though
Powell's program was anything but an environmental initiative, Powell's was a piece of "ecological
realism in an unsympathetic age." Donald worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the
Growth of the American West 133 (1985). In the long history of conflict between conservationists
and developers, the rough treatment Powell's program received has been a sobering tale.
15. Columbia River Basin Fishery Resources: Hearing on S. Con. Res. 35, S. 2586, S. 1420
Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate andForeign Commerce, 86th Cong. 208 (1960).
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high dams proved to be insurmountable, 6 and hatchery compensation
programs have been problematic. 7 These difficulties laid the
groundwork for the species conflicts of today.
In the Columbia River, the Puget Sound region, and other places,
remedial efforts are based on mechanistic approaches. Hatcheries have
replaced wild fish with hatchery fish to a large extent. 8 Dams retrofitted
with screens to keep fish out of turbines were successful in some places
and disappointing in others.' 9 Managers of remedial fish and wildlife
programs augmented stream flows with stored water, but the results were
debatable." Woody structures placed in"streams to create resting areas
for fish worked in some places, but washed out in others. 2' We assumed
that if we did enough of these things we could fix the problem. This idea
has appeal in a political system that is disinclined to push restrictions on
humans.
C.

The EndangeredSpecies Act andIndividualSpecies

Notwithstanding the mechanistic programs, in the early 1990s the
Endangered Species Act riveted the Columbia River region's attention
on the question of what to do about wild salmon, particularly those that
spawn in the Snake River. The problem, however, had deep roots.
Salmon began their downward slide in the early part of this century.' By

16. See Michael C. Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon: The Struggle of the Pacific Northwest's
Anadromous Fish Resources for a Peaceful Coexistence with the Federal Columbia River Power
System, 11 Envtl. L. 211,240-41(1981).
17. "In summary, the LSRCP Hatchery Program and the LSRCP mitigation efforts haven't been
able [to] meet expectations and come close to the pre-dam target levels for adult chinook
returns .... Although the steelhead picture is better, the post Lower Snake River dam project returns
remain well below the pre-dam levels." Dan Herrig, Lower Snake River Compensation Plan
Background, in Lower Snake River Compensation Plan Status Review Symposium 14, 18 (1998).
18. See Northwest Power Planning Council, Compilation of Information on Salmon and
Steelhead Losses in the Columbia River Basin, app. D at 212 (1987) [hereinafter Salmon and
Steelhead Losses]; Wilkinson & Conner, supranote 2, at 81-84.
19. See Return to the River, supranote 11, at 288-308; Upstream, supranote 8, at 238, 240.
20. See Upstream,supra note 8, at 246,351.
21. See d at 218-19.
22. Some scientists point to 1921 as the year in which Columbia River salmon began to decline.
See Return to the River, supranote 11. But the matter is debatable. A number of salmon stocks were
wiped out by overfishing in the late 19th century, and in 1894, a federal fisheries official said it was
"beyond question" that the numbers of salmon returning to spawn were "insignificant in comparison
with the number which some years ago annually visited and spawned in these waters." William
Dietrich, Northwest Passage: The Great Columbia River 188 (1995); see also U.S. Dep't of Agric.
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the mid-1980s, the decline was far advanced. The Columbia River Basin
runs were by the mid-1980s only about twenty-five percent wild;23 by
1990, the wild populations seemed to be careening downhill. Decades of
expanding hatchery programs meant that fishermen had grown to expect
the large harvests that hatcheries fed.24 At the same time, salmon
populations were less diverse genetically, less adapted to their
environment, more prone to disease, and apparently more vulnerable to
changes in ocean conditions.25 As hatchery production increased, the
Basin was trading vigorous wild fish populations for dull-witted hatchery
fish.26 One prominent article reported that wild Pacific Coast salmon
populations were at critically low numbers.27 The message was in some
ways surprising," and in some ways not. Wild fish advocates had
claimed for years that wild stocks were in trouble. The article simply
documented the trend in a way that was impossible to ignore.
The Snake River populations were listed under the Endangered
Species Act in the early 1990s.29 However, there was an initial question
whether Snake River salmon should be listed, given that other Columbia
River populations remained viable: should Snake River populations be
considered distinct from Columbia River populations for purposes of the
Endangered Species Act? The Endangered Species Act defines "species"
as "any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct
population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which

& U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Status ofthe Interior Columbia Basin: Summary ofScientific Findings
46(1996).
23. See Northwest Power Planning Council, Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program
7-13 (1994); Salmon and Steelhead Losses, supra note 18, app. D at 212; Wilkinson & Conner,
supranote 2.
24. See Upstream, supra note 8, at 320; Michael Goodman, Preserving the Genetic Diversity of
Salmonid Stocks: A Callfor FederalRegulation of Hatchery Programs, 20 Envtl. L. 111, 140-41
(1990); Wilkinson & Conner, supranote 2, at 81-83.
25. See Upstream, supra note 8, at 3, 18.
26. See Ray Hilborn, Hatcheries and the Future of Salmon in the Northwest, 17 Fisheries 5
(1992); Ray J. White et al., Better Roles for Fish Stocking in Aquatic Resource Management, 15
Am. Fisheries Soc'y Symp. 527, 530 (1995).
27. See Willa Nehlsen et al., Pacific Salmon at the Crossroads:Stocks at Risk from Califomia,
Oregon, Idaho and Washington, 16 Fisheries No. 4 at4 (1991).
28. See infra Part ll.D.
29. See 50 C.F.R. § 222.23 (1998) (listing Snake River sockeye salmon as endangered); 50 C.F.R.
§ 227.4(g)-(h) (1998) (listing Snake River spring/summer and fall chinook salmon as threatened);
50 C.F.R. § 227.4(f)-(g) (1998) (listing Snake River spring/summer and fall chinook salmon as
endangered).
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interbreeds when mature."3 Interpreting this language, the National
Marine Fisheries Service concluded that a local salmon population would

qualify as a protected population segment if it were an "evolutionarily
significant unit," that is, a population that is important to the
evolutionary process. The Snake River populations satisfied this test,
and since then the Fisheries Service has geared the Act's protective
machinery toward these populations.
In the process, the Endangered Species Act delivered an ambiguous
message regarding reliance on technology. While the Endangered

Species Act is concerned with wild stocks, its administration has been
oriented to specific salmon populations. This is not an inevitable result,

but it does follow a larger pattern in the Act's administration. One of the
Endangered Species Act's purposes is to "provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species

depend may be conserved." 32 For many years, however, this has been
primarily a rhetorical principle, and critics contend that the Act actually
diverts attention from the task of protecting ecological processes that
support biodiversity.33 For example, the National Marine Fisheries
Service, which administers the Act for salmon, prescribes captive brood
stock technology-the quintessential technological fix-for the weakest
Snake River stocks.34 Moreover, fish barging is still an important part of
the Columbia River recovery program. 5 There is a rationale for these

30. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (1994).
31. The concept is explained in Robin S.Waples, Definition of "Species" Under the Endangered
Species Act: Application to PacificSalmon 9 (1991).
32. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994). Interagency consultation regulations require federal agencies to
consider "the direct and indirect effects of [their] action[s] on the species or critical habitat, together
with the effects of other activities that are interrelated or interdependent with that action." 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.02 (1998).
33. See Holly Doremus, Patchingthe Ark: ImprovingLegal ProtectionofBiological Diversity, 18
Ecology L.Q. 265, 304-17 (1991); Goodman, supra note 24, at 148-55 (1990); Suzanne Winckler,
Stopgap Measures, Atlantic Monthly, Jan. 1992, at 74, 78.
34. See National Marine Fisheries Serv., Interim Standardsfor the Use of Captive Propagation
Technology in Recovery of Anadromous Salmonids Listed Under the Endangered Species Act 4
(1999).
35. See American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 126 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1997)
(remanding for trial to allow environmental groups to challenge biological opinion that supported
barging); Northwest Resource Info. Ctr., Inc. v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d 1060 (9th
Cir. 1995) (upholding fish transportation against challenge under National Environmental Policy
Act). To this point, there have been a small number of steelhead populations found to be jeopardized
by hatchery operations. See National Marine Fisheries Serv., Biological Opinion on Artficial
Propagationin the ColumbiaRiver Basin 137 (1999).
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methods in the short term: the few remaining wild populations represent
a unique genetic heritage and if a degraded natural environment is more
dangerous for fish than technology, technology may make sense. But the
short-term rationale does little to address the long-term question of
whether we can create a hospitable environment for salmon.
D.

Two LandmarkScientific Reports Urge More Reliance on Nature

Over the last twenty years or so, there has been incremental
recognition that technological solutions need to work with natural
functions rather than supplant them. However, before the mid-1990s, this
idea had a muted voice in the Columbia River region. In the mid-1990s,
two landmark reports pushed the idea to the foreground, where it began
to reshape the debate over the river. This section reviews the two reports
and their role in conservation efforts.
It is hard to convey just how suddenly the Columbia River/
Endangered Species Act problem seemed to emerge in the 1990s. During
the 1980s, parties involved in salmon conservation enjoyed big political
and legal gains. Congress had enacted sweeping legislation, contending
parties had negotiated domestic and international harvest agreements,
and the federal hydropower system had committed large financial
resources to fish and wildlife mitigation. As late as 1989, some observers
were ready to declare victory;36 salmon were on the upswing.37 It was
little more than a year later that an important article reported wild salmon
stocks in critical conditions38 and the Endangered Species Act process
was engaged.39
After the shock settled in, Congress asked the National Academy of
Sciences to review the science underlying the salmon declines. In
response, the National Research Council's Committee on Protection and
Management of Pacific Northwest Anadromous Salmonids published a
report in 1996 entitled Upstream: Salmon and Society in the Pacific

36. See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 214.
37. "[R]ecent fishery data show that overall runs are increasing and that the previously
endangered runs have stabilized." Michael B. Early & Egil Krogh, Balancing Power Costs and
Fisheries Values Under the Northwest Power Act, 13 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 281, 315 (1990)
(citing K. Pratt & D. Chapman, Progress Toward the Run Doubling Goal of the Northwest Power
PlanningCouncil (1989)).
38. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
39. See supranote 29 and accompanying text.
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Northwest.' The report emphasizes that the salmon problem is an
ecosystem problem for which there is no single solution, no magic bullet
that would lead to recovery.41 As the committee's chair put it, "The
'salmon problem' in the Pacific Northwest can be dealt with only if
diverse interests work together on the many issues that unfold during the
salmon's life-cycle."42 Upstream points out the limitations of many of
the mitigation strategies that have been tried.43 The report observes that
some technologies appear to lessen fish mortality, but no combination of
existing strategies adds up to recovery. Rather, the report contends that
the Northwest region needs to restore a higher degree of natural
ecological function to the Columbia River ecosystem for salmon to
recover to self-sustaining levels.' The report also comments on the
institutional fragmentation in the Columbia River's management
regime.4 5 The report notes that a number of federal, state, and tribal
management and regulatory agencies are sometimes doing overlapping
work, sometimes cooperating with each other, and sometimes working at
cross-purposes.46
About a year later, a panel commissioned by the Northwest Power
Planning Council to do a related review filed a report with a similar
message. The report is entitled Return to the River: Restoration of
Salmonid Fishes in the Columbia River Ecosystem,4 7 and its verdict is
even more dramatic: unless we can restore more ecological function to
the Columbia River ecosystem, wild salmon face extinction over the next
50-100 years, and various technologies can do no more than delay the
inevitable.48 The report cautions us to look carefully for what is left and

40. Upstream,supra note 8.

41. See id at 378.
42. National Research Council, New ManagementApproaches Needed to Restore Pacific Salmon
Populations(Nov. 8, 1995) (press release quoting Dr. John Magnuson) (on file with author).
43. See generally Upstream, supranote 8.

44. See id.
at 4.
45. See id. at24, 139-40,324-26,358-59.

46. See id.
47. Return to the River, supranote 11. For two shorter summaries of the report, see Independent
Scientific Group, Scientific Issues in the Restoration of Salmonid Fishes in the Columbia River, 24
Fisheries 10 (1999) [hereinafter Scientific Issues], and Independent Scientific Group, Return to the
River: An Ecological Vision for the Recovery of the Columbia River Salmon, 28 Envtl. L. 503

(1998).
48. See Return to the River,supra note 11, at 5, 7.
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find ways to restore and reconnect functioning elements of the
ecosystem.49
Upstream and Return to the River elaborate on these points in
different ways, but both underscore three themes. First, they emphasize
the importance of restoring more ecological function to the river and
relying less on complex, expensive, and ultimately ineffective
technologies." Second, they recommend careful consideration of the
population structure.5 Third, progress in restoration will be difficult to
see due to unpredictable effects of the ocean. 2
1.

The Importanceof an Ecologically Functioning("Normative')
River

Return to the River illustrates its point with the metaphor of a
"working river." 3 The contemporary working river (the industrial river)
does the work of power generation, irrigation, flood control, and
navigation, and it works because humans have simplified the river's
complexity. The dams' storage capacity enables us to manage flow
releases to respond to demand for electric energy, to protect against
floods, and to float over the cataracts that once made the river so difficult
to navigate. Dams have made the river simpler and more manageable.
With hatcheries, barges, flow augmentation programs, turbine screens,
and other mitigation programs, we have followed a similar path. We
have simplified the salmon population into one that we release from
hatcheries in time periods that fit harvest plans and minimize conflicts
with hydropower generation. Over time, we have achieved a working
river with more manageable species. In Richard White's words, the river
has become an organic machine.54
One of the problems, according to Return to the River, is that
biologically productive rivers are complicated. They have braided
channels, intricate hydrologic processes, and huge populations of insects.
They have rapids and falls. They may flood and recede, change channels,
49. See id. at 5-6,512.
50. See id. at 506-07; Upstream, supra note 8, at 6,26-27.
51. See Return to the River, supra note 11, at 30, 444-45, 509; Upstream, supra note 8, at 97-98,
353-64,370.
52. See Return to the River,supra note 11, at 463, 491; Upstream, supranote 8, at 39.
53. See generally Return to the River, supra note 11, at 5-8, 19-20, 511-20, for a discussion of
the "normative river."
54. See Richard White, The OrganicMachine90 (1995); see also ScientificIssues, supra note 47, at 10.
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and push sediment and gravel around. These more complex rivers are
also "working rivers" because their natural functions work to transform
energy into nutrients and support a rich diversity of species. If the
Columbia were this kind of working river, there would be a resilient
salmon population with many salmon stocks migrating at different times,
returning to different habitats, and interacting in obscure and
unpredictable ways.
Return to the River calls this complex working river a "normative
river," one that meets specific functional norms that are essential to
productive salmon populations. In the report's view of the world, we are
spending hundreds of millions of dollars a year on fish and wildlife
programs trying to make up for the work that the natural river could
perform gratis. Whether or not a normative river makes sense
industrially, Return to the River argues that the industrial river cannot
work for salmon over the long run, even with the technological and other
fixes we have devised over the last twenty years.
Return to the River does not, however, overdramatize the idea of a
normative river. Although the report portrays a significant divide
between the normative river and the river of today, the choice is in some
ways less stark. The authors of the report took pains to emphasize that
they are not arguing that a pristine system must be restored. Rather, they
suggest movement toward normative conditions; the movement might be
slow, fast, or somewhere in between. Next year's river might not look
much different from this year's river. But Return to the River proposes a
river ecosystem that, over time, has significantly healthier habitat,
connects flowing streams, and supports diverse species.
2.

Ecological Communities, Metapopulations,and CorePopulations

The two reports make a second point: a species is part of an ecological
community with its own population structure." Species are linked to
other flora and fauna, insects, and processes that inhabit the same part of
the world; together they are "one humming community of co-operations
and competitions."5" Both reports argue that if we are serious about
restoring species, we need to be serious about these communities."'

55. See Return to the River,supra note 11, at xviii, 508; Upstream, supranote 8, at 35-36.
56. Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac 193 (1966).
57. See Return to the River, supra note 11, at 5,511-12; Upstream,supranote 8,at 35-36.
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The subtler point is that animal populations have unique structures.
Ecologists think that even a single species is composed of interacting
local populations that together comprise a metapopulation 8 Upstream
and Return to the River argue that we should begin to think of Columbia
River salmon as metapopulations whose pre-development structure could
illuminate the effectiveness of mitigation strategies.59
The reports also say that for the most part, the Columbia's big salmon
populations were primarily in the mainstem of the Columbia River and in
the lower reaches of major tributaries.6" These alluvial reaches were
biologically rich areas that bred microorganisms and insects that fueled
food chains. For salmon, these were the hot spots of productivity, the
cores of the big pre-development salmon runs.6 When these alluvial core
populations were strong, Columbia River salmon production was strong.
These populations were different from the populations that spawned in
higher tributary areas. Headwater spawners occupy less-favorable
ecological niches-the farther from the alluvial core, the sparser the food
supply, and the smaller the population. To some degree, the
interconnections among populations are important. For example, if a
mudslide wiped out a tributary population, the tributary might be
recolonized from the mainstem. If a mainstem population thinned, it
might be fed from the headwaters. However, the alluvial core is a vital
component: the bigger the core, the more resilient the population overall.
For many years, Columbia River recovery efforts have focused on the
smaller tributary populations in headwater areas. This is because these
populations are almost the only populations we have left; development
has mostly eradicated mainstem core populations. But the irony is that
salmon conservation programs are likely to be fragile unless they
resuscitate core populations in alluvial reaches. Whether the objective is
long-term sustainability or rebuilding harvestable runs, a large mainstem
core population is important.
One of the problems with basing salmon recovery on core populations
in alluvial areas is that people and salmon both prefer productive, alluvial
country. Cities like Portland, Yakima, and Pendleton are in alluvial areas.
A great deal of irrigated farming and grazing occurs in alluvial plains.
Big dams in the river's mainstem inundate or block alluvial river reaches.
58. See Return to the River,supra note 11, at 29-30.
59. See id.; Upstream,supra note 8, at 97-98, 363-64, 370.
60. See Return to the River, supranote 11, at 445, 509; Upstream, supranote 8 at 97-98.
61. See Return to the River,supra note 11, at 30.
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Salmon were pushed out of these areas, and the salmon that are left
generally spawn elsewhere-some in hatcheries, some in headwater
areas.
There are, however, some alluvial populations left. Upriver bright fall
chinook spawn in the last free-flowing stretch of the Columbia, upstream
of the Columbia-Snake confluence in south central Washington. 62 The
"brights" are now the biggest naturally spawning segment of the
Columbia runs, one of the few populations that might still serve as a
core. Ironically, they spawn in the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, which
is the site of stored nuclear waste that may seep into the Columbia some
day. Nonetheless, if we are looking for an area in which to rebuild a core
population to interact with tributary populations, Return to the River
suggests that building out from the Hanford Reach area is an obvious
way to start.63
3.

Overwhelming Uncertaintyin the Ocean

Finally, after suggesting the possibility of an ecologically structured
approach to species recovery, Upstream emphasizes the difficulty of
determining whether specific recovery measures were effective, and
traces much of this problem to the ocean.' What happens in the ocean
plays a critical role in the status of salmon stocks. If ocean conditions are
unfavorable to Columbia River stocks, fewer salmon will return to
spawn. If ocean conditions are favorable, salmon stocks will thrive. How
can we distinguish the effects of ocean conditions, which fluctuate from
year to year, from the effects of salmon recovery efforts? For example,
Upstream posits that the apparent effectiveness of hatcheries might have
resulted from favorable ocean and climatic conditions during the period
when hatcheries were built, and conversely, the decline of some
populations might have resulted from introducing new hatchery
populations into an ocean pasture of limited capacity.65
The uncertainty stemming from the ocean has stark implications for
policy. One of the best examples is described in Arthur McEvoy's study

62. See Return to the River, supra note 11, at 31.

63. Seeid. at xx, 31, 519.
64. See Upstream, supranote 8, at 39.
65. See id. at 45.
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of the pelagic (open-sea) fisheries collapse in California.6 6 During the
second half of the nineteenth century, abalone off the California coast
were abundant because fur traders had slaughtered the otter that preyed
on abalone.67 But when climatic factors later caused abalone and other
species to decline, white fishermen accused the Chinese of depleting the
fisheries and drove them from the fishing grounds. 6' Actually, the
Chinese had helped other fisheries because their elimination of abalone
had increased the growth of kelp, thereby augmenting the food supply for
other fish.69 As fish populations increased at the end of the century, white
fishermen attributed it to their success in driving the Chinese away.7 ° In
short, ecological, social, and environmental changes interacted to affect
humans who never understood the consequences of their own actions.7
Similar hazards arise in the Columbia River salmon debate. Uncertainties
over cause and effect create rich opportunities for misunderstanding,
inequity, and error. Upstream notes that ocean ecology has long been an
area of "deep ignorance," and we are only beginning to consider how to
contend with it.72
In dealing with these uncertainties, it is worth remembering a caution
mentioned earlier in this Article: ecological science, like atmospheric
science and economics, deals in "broad-brush analysis, illustration of
mechanisms, and short-term predictions" rather than in precise answers.73
This should by no means imply that ecological science is not useful.
Many areas of science, such as quantum physics, are inexact.74 When we
consider questions of species conservation, we can make statistical
predictions and broad estimates, but often we cannot make precise
predictions or explain the forces that affect specific outcomes.

66. See Arthur F. McEvoy, The Fisherman's Problem: Ecology and Law in the California
Fisheries, 1850-1980 (1986).
67. See id. at 79, 81.
68. See Richard White, It's Your Misfortune and None ofMy Own 15 (1991).
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. Seeid. at 214-15.
72. Upstream, supranote 8, at 45.
73. Lewis, supranote 7 and accompanying text.
74. Quantum physics assumes that events in the atomic realm do not occur deterministically, but
rather, probabilistically. we cannot accurately predict the behavior of atomic particles. Any given
electron might jump this way or that, and physicists can only ascribe a probability to the outcome.
Events are predictable only in a more generalized, statistical sense. See Richard Feynman et al., The
Feynman Lectures on Physics: Quantum Mechanics 2-8 to 2-9 (1966).

Managing Uncertainty
Upstream and Return to the River are mixtures of insight, guidance,
and cautions, but most importantly, they lead to a central question: how
can a developed ecosystem move toward greater ecological function
when the wild ecosystem has vanished and been replaced by one that is
reengineered to meet the demands of a large, growing human
population?
The question arrives at an interesting moment. The National Marine
Fisheries Service is poised to write a new biological opinion on whether
the federal Columbia River hydropower system jeopardizes listed Snake
River salmon. The opinion is expected to address the so-called
"configuration" issue surrounding the Lower Snake River dams.
Configuration involves the question of whether removing the earthen
parts of those dams and restoring the Lower Snake to a free-flowing
condition would play a key role in recovery. Restoring free-flowing
conditions by removing dams sounds like a step toward Return to the
River's normative conditions. But whether removing these dams for
these species is appropriate in light of competing human values, is a
mixed question of science, law, and policy.
Although this federal process has focused on Snake River salmon, the
Snake River stocks represent a relatively narrow subset of a large,
interrelated set of populations. Upstream and Return to the River suggest
a broader focus in which underlying ecological processes are central and
the structure of salmon metapopulations is important! 5 Thus, our vision
is still too simplistic, and the list of things we do not know is still long
and growing even as we learn. Making decisions will require us to
account for phenomena on which science still sheds limited light. The
next section discusses ways to manage in this obscurity.
III. MANAGING UNCERTAINTY: TOOLS FOR SPECIES
CONSERVATION
Policy makers will be able to make intelligent decisions in conservation policy only if they understand the conservation tools available to
them, including those used for managing uncertainties that surround
complex conservation problems. In the Columbia River effort,
conservation methods are still evolving, but the risk management toolbox
is much larger than it was even ten years ago. Many of the methods
75. See Return to the River, supranote 11, at 5-6, 30, 445, 509, 512; Upstream, supra note 8, at
6,26-27, 39, 97-98, 363-64, 370.
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represent efforts to implement a scientific management approach called
adaptive management, which recognizes that conservation initiatives are
often more experimental than proven. With the assumption that no
conservation measure will necessarily work, Columbia Basin managers
have used four tools in particular: applied research into important but
narrow questions; collaborative computer simulations to test hypotheses
and identify key uncertainties; independent boards of scientists to
synthesize scientific knowledge; and ecology-based analysis to inform
policy debates' broad goals and management frameworks. As discussed
later in this Article, none of these techniques has yet succeeded in
creating a systematic approach to experimentation. They are, however,
bringing scientists and policy makers closer to adaptive management's
goals of acting in the face of uncertainty, and learning from that action.
A.

Adaptive Management

By the 1980s, there was plain evidence that mitigation programs were
not countering population declines. Ka Lee, a University of Washington
professor who was then a member of the Northwest Power Planning
Council, argued that traditional fish and wildlife mitigation efforts had in
many cases either failed or produced unintended results.76 Drawing on
the work of C.S. Holling, Carl Walters, and others," Lee and his
colleague, Jody Lawrence, urged that this simply required policy makers
to depart from traditional assumptions and adopt an approach called
adaptive management.7" This approach asserts that because natural
systems are much more complex and unpredictable than traditional
management acknowledges, all fish and wildlife management efforts are
intrinsically experimental.7 9 Drawing from this idea, Lee urged "a simple

76. See, e.g., Lee & Lawrence, supranote 2, at 440 n.40.
77. See Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management (C.S. Holling ed., 1978); Carl
Walters, Adaptive Management ofRenewable Resources (1986).
78. See Lee & Lawrence, supranote 2.
79. See Compass and Gyroscope, supra note 1, at 9; Lee & Lawrence, supra note 2, at 443;
Willis McConnaha & Peter Paquet, Adaptive Strategies for the Management of Ecosystems: The
Columbia River Experience, in MultidimensionalApproaches to Reservoir FisheriesManagement,
16 Am. Fisheries Soc'y Syrp. 410, 410-12 (Leandro E. Miranda & Dennis R. DeVries eds.,
1996); John M. Volkman & Willis McConnaha, Through a Glass, Darkly: Columbia River
Salmon, the EndangeredSpecies Act, and Adaptive Management, 23 Envtl. L. 1249, 1255 (1993).
Chapter 13 of Upstream, supra note 8, puts adaptive management on the Columbia River into a
useful institutional context.
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imperative: policies are experiments; learnfrom them."' We are almost
invariably going to be surprised by the results of what we do. We should
treat conservation initiatives as hypotheses and learn from them."1
Adaptive management has several nuances. First, unlike traditional
management regimes, it does not assume the effectiveness of existing
programs. Adaptive management requires skepticism about existing programs, an active search for the assumptions underlying these programs,
and a commitment to test them. Where objectives such as maximum
sustainable harvest drive traditional programs, the potential for learning
drives adaptive management Where management practices drive
existing programs, experimental observation drives adaptive
management. Rather than professing certainty, adaptive management
begins in doubt,trusting only experimental evidence.
The second premise of adaptive management is that we can learn from
management programs only if they have measurable results. Whether we
can measure the effects of a given action depends on its ecological
context, but in many instances only dramatic action can produce a
measurable response in an ecosystem. Adaptive management does not
call just for experimentation, but for experimentation that generates a
measurable response.
A third premise of adaptive management is that to have any hope of
producing experimentally significant results in a developed ecosystem,
experimentation must account for its social context. Because ecosystems
have extensive ties to human communities, the prospect of bold
experimentation implies significant human impacts. Actions with
significant human impacts must pass a variety of legal and political tests.
Interested parties need to participate in considering potential
experiments, come to an understanding of what is known and unknown,
and decide what might make a significant difference to species. Adaptive
management has been applied largely in the harvest arena, where
experimentation requires cooperation with fisheries, which need to be
convinced of the value of dramatic closures.82 In this sense, the concept
of adaptive management raises a the question whether we can devise
80. Compass and Gyroscope,supra note 1, at 9.

81. See Lee & Lawrence, supra note 2, at 443.
82. See Murdoch K. McAllister & Randall M. Peterman, ExperimentalDesignin the Management
of Fisheries, 12 N. Am. J. Fisheries Mgmt. 1, 15-16 (1992); see also Jeremy S. Collie & Carl J.
Walters, Adaptive Management of Spatially Replicated Groundflsh Populations, 48 Canadian J.
Fisheries & Aquatic Sci. 1273 (1991); Carl J. Walters & Ray Hilbom, Adaptive ControlofFishing
Systems, 33 J. Fisheries Res. Board Can. 145 (1976).
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meaningful experiments when we temper them with legal and political
considerations.
Finally, adaptive management uses computer models to structure a
learning process. The process begins with an effort to integrate
experience and information into models that attempt to make predictions
about the effects of alternative actions. In building such a model, analysts

usually must integrate a mass of disparate information. They must clarify
the nature of the problem, discard unpromising management options, and
identify critical knowledge gaps to address through experimentation. 3
Since the mid-1980s, scientists, policy makers, and fish and wildlife
managers in the Columbia River have endorsed the concept of adaptive
management to manage uncertainty. The concept is promising for
clarifying scientific knowledge, measuring progress toward conservation
goals, and using a collaborative process. The next sections describe how
the concept of adaptive management has played out in the Columbia
River salmon conservation effort.
B.

Four Ways to Learn

The Columbia River conservation effort has involved four policylearning tools: applied research, collaborative computer modeling,
independent science boards, and development of an ecologically oriented
policy framework. These tools have emerged not from a single process,
but from the separate efforts of a variety of parties. The tools have not
evolved in a manner that we could have predicted, and this unpredictability is a central characteristic of the Columbia River parties' efforts to
learn from the implementation of conservation policy.
1.

Applied Research: Big Questions, NarrowAnswers

When species conservation initiatives affect humans, policy makers
want scientific answers that gauge human impacts and support nuanced
solutions that leave whole as many interests as possible. However, the
broad-brush science of ecology has little to say about these nuances. In
theory, adaptive management experiments should afford a way to
generate more targeted answers and assist decisionmaking.

83. See Carl J. Walters, Challenges in Adaptive Management of Ripartan and Coastal
Ecosystems, I Conservation Ecology 1 (December 1997) <http://www.consecol.org/voll/iss2/artl>.
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In the Columbia River Basin, policy makers and researchers
developed a program of applied research to test mitigation measures. For
much of the last two decades, the debate over mitigation methods has
focused on addressing the effects of mainstem dams, emphasizing costly
methods such as flow augmentation, spill programs, and mechanical
bypass systems at the dams. These measures drew attention because
hydropower dams have played a big role in salmon declines and
mitigating these effects is costly. Current costs for mitigation measures
run into the millions of dollars. They include repaying the cost of capital
investments in mitigation technology and the revenue effects of measures
such as flow augmentation and spill, which depend on runoff, energy
market conditions, and other assumptions.' There is undeniable interest
in finding out whether the investment in these measures is well spent.
One of the biggest controversies in this collection of measures is the
effect of flow augmentation on salmon survival in the Columbia and
Snake Rivers. Since the early 1980s, conservation programs have
released water from headwater storage reservoirs to augment the flow of
these rivers for salmon. To some people, the logic of the flow
augmentation program is perfectly obvious: salmon need water and the
more, the better. But the reason why increased flows might help salmon
is more complex. The Columbia and Snake are big rivers. They do not
need more water to keep from drying up. Rather, if more water is useful,
it is because it changes the rivers' ecology for the better. Flow
augmentation may help if the problem is that the rivers run too slowly to
get juvenile salmon to the estuary consistent with the tick of a biological
clock. Increased flows may help to eliminate conditions favoring fish
that prey on salmon. Increased flows may replicate the spring freshet that
the dams eliminated, and push fresh water into the ocean. But if none of
these factors is a real problem for salmon, or if the problems are so large
that flow augmentation does nothing for them, the investment may be
better spent on less costly measures like fish barging or more
controversial steps like dam removal.
There has been hot dispute over flow augmentation proposals for
many years, but biological data have been sparse. Data collected between
1973-79 tend to support the idea that increased flows help juvenile

84. Capital costs and a high valuation of operational costs are described in Bonneville Power
Administration, White Paper: What is BPA Spendingfor Fish and Wildlife? (March 1998). Other
analysts put operational costs lower than Bonneville does. Personal Communication with John Fazio,
Northwest Power Planning Council, in Portland, Or. (Feb. 18, 1999).
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salmon in their spring migration in low-water years. " But the data are
unclear about the benefits in wetter years, and there are questions about
the data's relevance for today's river. Information on fish barging also
has been the subject of fierce argument, and finding a way to generate
better information on either conservation method has been contentious.
It took a full ten years before researchers could implement a new
research program.86 And even then, the result was not a bold
management experiment in which key variables were manipulated.
Instead, researchers monitored the survival of salmon that used different
means of downriver passage, such as passing through reservoirs, or being
collected and barged around dams. The research program, begun in the
early 1990s and still underway, uses new technology for tagging fish
with computer chips. The chips are called "PIT-tags," and they allow the
identification of the individual fish at certain points in the downstream
migration. The resulting data, while still preliminary, seem to show
several things: (1) juvenile spring chinook salmon are surviving through
the four Lower Snake projects far better than was previously thought; (2)
transported fish survive barging well;87 and (3) based on a year's study of
a limited stretch of the river, the relationship between flow and survival
is much more convincing for summer-migrating fish than for springmigrating fish.88
Unfortunately, the PIT-tag research answers only some questions and
raises others. The unexpectedly high survival of juvenile fish through the
four Lower Snake projects is certainly important. But if we are losing so
few young fish in these reservoirs, why are returns of adult salmon to
Snake Basin spawning grounds continuing to decline at such a rate?
Some people insist that the problem can only be elsewhere in the
system-poor habitat, adverse ocean conditions, competition from
hatchery fish, predators, or other perhaps unknowable factors.89 Others
85. See Carl W. Sims & Frank J. Ossiander, Migrations of Juvenile Chinook Salmon and
Steelhead Trout in the Snake River Basin from 1973 Through 1979: A Research Summary 19-21
(1981).
86. See Volkman & McConnaha, supra note 79, at 1259-61.
87. See Northwest Fisheries Science Ctr., National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., An
Assessment of the Lower Snake River Hydrosystem Alternatives on Survival and Recovery of Snake
River Salmonids, Appendix to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Lower Snake River Juvenile
Salmonid Migration FeasibilityStudy at 3 (1999) [hereinafter Assessment].
88. See Bill Muir, National Marine Fisheries Serv., Address to the Northwest Power Planning
Council (Jan. 12, 1999).
89. See James J. Anderson, Assoc. Professor, Seh. of Fisheries, U. of Wash., Testimony Before
the U.S. Senate Subcomm. on Water and Power (Apr. 6, 1999) (on file with author).
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say the declines are due at least in part to the delayed effects of the dams,
which the PIT-tag research does not measure. No one can say if any of
these explanations is right, and the PIT-tag data fail to resolve the
question. The truth may be that the problem is more complex than the
PIT-tag research alone can penetrate. This underscores the need for a
broader framework for research and analysis.
2.

Computer Modeling and the PATH Project

One of the suggestions of adaptive management is that computer
models can help describe a comprehensive framework in which to
understand ecological relationships. Models can provide a range of
groups with an understandable body of information and identify
interactions among key variables throughout the system. Such a tool
could, for example, help compensate for the narrowness of the PIT-tag
data, allowing us to see that study's results in a broader ecosystem
context.
A project called the Process for Analyzing and Testing Hypotheses
(PATH) uses computer models to test hypotheses regarding the decline
of Snake River salmon and to sketch out management experiments with
which to probe uncertainties." The project has had broad participation.9
The Bonneville Power Administration funds the project at the request of
the National Marine Fisheries Service, which took a court's advice to
involve a broader range of parties in developing its biological opinion on
hydropower impacts.92 The project has even older roots in a collaborative
analytical program begun by the Northwest Power Planning Council in
the 1980s. The project brings together a diverse group of technical
analysts to review data and identify alternative explanations and potential
solutions for salmon declines.93 Analysts treat these explanations as
90. See D. Marmorek & C. Peters, An OverWew ofPAT7H andRetrospectiveAnalyses at 2.
91. See Planfor Analyzing and Testing Hypotheses (PATH), Final Reportfor Fiscal Year 1998

eds., 1998).
(D.Marmorek et al.
92. In 1994, a court set aside the Fisheries Service's biological opinion on the effects of the
hydropower system. A court counseled the federal parties to open up the closed process in which the
biological opinion had been developed, to ensure that state fish and wildlife agency and tribal
scientists were heard: "[T]he underlying root of the litigation problem is the feeling of these parties
that the federal government is simply not listening to them." Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game v.
National Marine Fisheries Serv., 850 F. Supp. 886, 900 (D. Or. 1994).
93. Perhaps the best general description of the PATH process is in Northwest Power Planning
Council & National Marine Fisheries Serv., TechnologicalForum on PATH, Meeting notes (Feb. 25,
1999) (on file with author).
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hypotheses and run them through computer simulations. If a hypothesis
produces results that approximate historical data, this would lend support
to the hypothesis. Conversely, an inconsistency with historical data
would weaken the hypothesis. Over time, PATH sifts hypotheses through
the models, narrowing the range of plausible explanations and inferences
about potential solutions.
It would be hard to overstate the care with which the PATH
facilitators run the process. PATH surveys any hypothesis that its large
and diverse group of analysts care to offer.94 The analysts create
"decision trees" on which they map out these alternative explanations.95
These trees bring order to hypothetical causes and effects, but reach a
daunting level of complexity. Where there are disagreements over
analytical models, PATH incorporates alternative analyses using multiple
models and uses the results to test the efficacy of the models.96
In the fall of 1998, after several years of work, PATH prepared a
"weight-of-evidence" report that summarized the analyses, supplemented
with materials that divergent analysts thought would present a fairer
picture.97 PATH presented the materials to a Scientific Review Panel,
composed of four respected scientists from outside the Columbia River
Basin. The Review Panel evaluated the evidence and issued its own
report, ascribing weights and probabilities to competing hypotheses,
models, and potential solutions.98 The use of computer models simulating
salmon migration through the hydropower system has generated a great
deal of controversy in the last decade, and the Panel expressed concerns
about these models. 99 They found the models to be "adequate" for some
purposes and not for others, but gave more credence to one model.' 0 On
the question whether the weight of the evidence supported any given
management action, the Review Panel concluded that taking out the four

94. See id. at 4.
95. See id.
96. See Assessment, supranote 87, at 10-11; see also Planfor Analyzing and Testing Hypotheses
(PATH), FinalReportfor FiscalYear 1998 (D. Marmorek et al. eds., 1998).
97. See PATH Scientific Review Panel, Conclusions and Recommendations from the PATH
Weight of Evidence Workshop 8-11, 21 (1998) (held September 8-10, 1998, in Vancouver, B.C.,
Canada).
98. See id.
99. See id. at 21.
100. Seeid. at8-11, 21.
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Lower Snake dams would likely enable Snake River spring chinook to
reach Endangered Species Act recovery thresholds.'O°
The Review Panel's report generated an electric reaction when it first
came out. To some, the idea that removing these dams could make such a
large difference was inconsistent with the PIT-tag data showing good
salmon survival rates at the same dams. 2 One PATH participant-the
primary developer of the disfavored computer model-publicly criticized
the Review Panel's report and complained about the "dysfunctionality of
the PATH family."'0 3 Other parties portrayed the Review Panel's report
as a definitive resolution of the scientific issues, ignoring the Review
Panel's caveats and disclaimers.' They contended that the Review
Panel's conclusions were perfectly consistent with the PIT-tag data. The
dams could have had effects that the PIT-tag research did not measure.
For example, the dams could cause delayed mortality.0 5 Eliminating the
dams would also save adults that cannot find fish ladders as they migrate
upstream.
In April, the National Marine Fisheries Service issued an analysis
discussing the PATH results and the PIT-tag data. It concluded that
removing the four dams would help."0 6 However, the analysis noted
substantial uncertainty about whether dam removal was necessary for
recovery.0 7 The disagreement continues to boil.
Because the process of analyzing data was so exhaustive, PATH spent
little time discussing how the Basin might undertake experiments to
clarify remaining uncertainties. Accordingly, the Review Panel report
could comment only generally on three possible experimental manipulations: dam removal, elimination or substantial reduction of hatchery
releases, and ending barge transportation." 8 The Review Panel outlined
two ways to approach experimentation: take the cheapest action first,
monitor the effects, and then take progressively more costly steps; or

101. See id. at 17.
102. See Margaret Hollenbach, Reactions Mixed to Path's ProgressReport, 26 Columbia Basin
Bull. 2 (Dec. 14-18, 1998) <http:llwww.nwppe.orgbulletin/bull_26.btm>.
103. PATHReportFlawed, Says MajorParticipant,862 Clearing Up 10 (Jan. 25, 1999) (quoting
Jim Anderson, consultant to Bonneville Power Administration).

104. See Hollenbach, supra note 102.
105. See Assessment, supranote 87, at 101.
106. See id. at 4, 6, 105.

107. See id. at 6-7.
108. See id. at 8-10.
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take all the actions at once and then turn each one back on and evaluate
the results. 1 9
This discussion of turning large human developments "off" or "on"
illustrates the adaptive management paradox: in a large ecosystem,
experiments must be large enough to produce measurable changes, but
will entail large risk and expense. Gauging how far experiments have to
go to be informative is largely a scientific question, but judging how far
they can go before they trigger legal or political land mines is not. The
experimental manipulations the report mentions are likely to trigger
many responses. The PATH process can lay the groundwork for these
questions, but has only begun to do so. In the meantime, the political
debate will continue to take its course.
The PATH process also illustrates some of the hazards of scientists
and policy makers working together on controversial matters. The
Review Panel's report cannot be faulted for a lack of disclaimers. It
states, for example, that ecological processes are poorly understood, that
the data are spotty, that the models are crude, that research is needed, but
that the weight of the evidence tends to favor a certain option. In political
processes, however, such disclaimers do little to soften the political
implications of an opinion that cuts for or against certain values. The fact
that policy makers want independent, authoritative scientific opinion
based on careful analysis and collaboration does not mean that they will
welcome the results.
PATH also offers troubling lessons for those who hope for quick,
penetrating insights from bold experiments. PATH is slow and
expensive. We have only the broadest notion of an experimental
program, and no real idea of how one could turn large human systems on
or off. If ecosystem experimentation is to be part of practical
management, it will have to move quickly and with less extraordinary
ecological manipulations. But this renews the hard questions that
underlie adaptive management, such as whether experimentation can
move quickly and still bring along a critical mass of interested parties,
and whether less ambitious experimental manipulations can generate
measurable results in meaningful time frames.
Finally, Upstream and Return to the River raise questions about the
PATH report and the PIT-tag data. PATH is concerned primarily with
certain groups of Snake River salmon, particularly those that spawn in

109. See id. at 28.
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tributary headwaters."' The models that PATH uses treat the ecosystem
as having on and off switches for certain sources of salmon mortality.'
The PIT-tag data represent some of those switches. The questions PATH
asks are Endangered Species Act questions, such as whether we can
recover species to the relatively low levels that would allow them to be
removed from the endangered species list. The PATH Scientific Review
Panel's report concludes that we can probably recover this small
collection of species to the point that they no longer belong on the
endangered species list, but only by taking some fairly heroic steps."'
Return to the River and Upstream suggest quite a different objective:
creating a hardy, interacting set of metapopulations."3 Such an objective
represents a shift in perspective toward larger population structure,
reestablishing mainstem core populations, and protecting ecological
processes that such a structure implies. The models used in PATH have
no switches for these factors.
One further lesson from PATH, then, is that even when we frame
careful, densely analytical collaborative processes, they are ultimately
rooted in how we see the world. As this perspective changes from one
person to another, the number of hypotheses and the potential for
controversy multiplies. As perspective shifts with new scientific insights
like those of Upstream and Return to the River, the very process of
analysis must adapt to a new landscape. In both ways, ecological
processes are refracted through imperfect human lenses. Limitations in
human understanding of such systems are some of the most compelling
reasons to look to experimental learning. Experimentation can help us to
learn from systems we do not understand. Yet, PATH illustrates how
hard it can be even to discuss experimenting with well-developed
ecosystems.
3.

IndependentScience

A useful species conservation policy must begin with a scientific
picture of the relevant ecosystem, but scientific perspectives vary among
different stakeholders. For many years, Columbia River Basin
conservation efforts were based on battling scientific experts, having
110. See id. at 1.
111. See id. at 10-13.

112. See id.at 17.
113. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
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varying degrees of legal authority. Several laws accord fish and wildlife
managers special status in interpreting scientific information and setting
mitigation policy in the Columbia. The Endangered Species Act requires
the National Marine Fisheries Service to make scientific judgments
regarding listed ocean-migrating fish; the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
plays this role for other species.' 14 The Northwest Power Act requires the
Northwest Power Planning Council to give "due weight to the
recommendations, expertise, and legal rights and responsibilities" of
tribes and of fish and wildlife managers when the Council writes its fish
and wildlife program." 5 While the Council must create program
measures based on the "best available scientific knowledge, ' '" 6 one court
has said that this judgment is also one that fish and wildlife managers
should heavily influence." 7 Legally, then, fish and wildlife agencies and
tribes are important interpreters of scientific knowledge.
In the early 1990s, policy makers saw the need for a more independent
scientific perspective. Notwithstanding a big investment in rebuilding
fish and wildlife, salmon were still declining and no one could
demonstrate what difference mitigation efforts, guided largely by fish
and wildlife managers, were making. The traditional fish and wildlife
management perspective no longer seemed to fit very well in the
Endangered Species Act era. Developing fish and wildlife programs to
meet the needs of harvest managers rang off-key in a regime that was
concerned first and foremost with the survival of wild species. Moreover,
fish and wildlife initiatives in the 1980s were based on diverse
management agendas rather than on an integrated conception of the
river."' No single agency had brought the breadth of vision, the scientific
expertise, and the authority to bear in developing an integrated view of
the Basin.
Congress issued the first request for an independent scientific
perspective in 1992, and later others did the same. At Senator Hatfield's
behest, Congress asked the National Academy of Sciences to review "the
status of existing wild stocks and their habitat, genetic characteristics and
histories of the stocks, hatchery and production strategies, federal and
114. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (1994).
115. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(7) (1994).
116. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(6)(B) (1994).
117. See Northwest Resource Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371,
1391 (9th Cir. 1994).
118. See ScientificIssues, supranote 47, at 11.
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state anadromous fisheries management practices, and [to make]
recommendations to improve the prospects for long-term sustainability
of the species."' 19 Three years later, in 1995, the National Academy
committee circulated a draft of its report, Upstream:Salmon and Society
in the PacificNorthwest. It released the final version one year later. The
report had an entire chapter urging the creation of an independent science
board to ensure that research is "objective, focused on the most important
problems, scientifically sound, and free of political or policy bias."' 2 °
The National Marine Fisheries Service and the Northwest Power
Planning Council had already begun thinking along these lines. The
Council's fish and wildlife program called for such a group,12' as did the
National Marine Fisheries Service's 1994 proposed recovery plan."
Finally, Return to the River: Restoration of Salmonid Fishes in the
Columbia River Ecosystem, which came out in 1996, delivered a stinging
critique of the ways in which a collection of fish and wildlife mitigation
measures, each supported by a different management agency, could
detract from an integrated view of the ecosystem."2 The criticism was
consistent with the idea of an independent science board that could bring
a more integrated and objective perspective to the problem of species
conservation. The Northwest Power Planning Council and the National
Marine Fisheries Service created the Independent Scientific Advisory
Board (ISAB) in early 1996.
Given the obscure boundary between policy and science in the
Columbia region, the organization of the science board deserved thought.
As the PATH process demonstrates, the Columbia River issues involve
such high stakes that any clearly articulated opinion, scientific or not, is
likely to provoke criticism or suspicion of bias. Organizational structure
can influence this tendency positively or negatively. For example, a
neutral party facilitates PATH, and the process has some independent
scientific oversight. However, one of PATH's primary aims is to allow
contending analysts to do much of the work. This arrangement can build
119. National Research Council Comm'n on Life Sciences, National Academy of Sciences,
Protection and Management of the Pacific Northwest Anadromous Samonids 1 (Oct. 1992)
(unpublished, on file with author).
120. Upstream,supra note 8,at 353.
121. See Northwest Power Planning Council, Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program
§ 3.20B.1, at 3-9 (1994).
122. See National Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Proposed Recovery Plan for Snake River
Salmon at 1"1-7
(1995).
123. See Return to the River,supra note 11, at 43-45.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 74:719, 1999

understanding, but it can also afford the opportunity for opposing
analysts to work the process to their own advantage. In contrast, the
science board created by the Council and the Fisheries Service is
intended to be independent and perceived to be independent. Because it
would not involve interested parties, such a science board may offer less
opportunity to build understanding among competing parties. However,
it can build trust through careful work, persuasive analysis, and independence. The challenge is in creating a board with real independence,
but with the ability to provide advice that responds to agencies' policy
mandates.
The ISAB structure meets this challenge in several ways. 2 4 First, two
different agencies, the National Marine Fisheries Service and the
Northwest Power Planning Council, choose the board's members.'25 The
agencies have separate missions, political constituencies, and responsibilities, which reduce the potential for one agency or the other to skew
the board to a political agenda. Under the Endangered Species Act, the
federal Fisheries Service focuses on the needs of listed species, including
how they are affected by land and water management systems.' 26 On the
other hand, under the Northwest Power Act, the Northwest Power
Planning Council, a four-state council, must accommodate a very
different constellation of interests, including a broader range of fish and
wildlife; a narrower range of effects on fish and wildlife (the effects from
hydropower development); the region's need for an adequate, efficient,
economical, and reliable power supply; the activities of fish and wildlife
managers and Indian tribes; and the administrative and financial
constraints of the federal hydropower system.' 27 The balance of power
between the two agencies reduces the chance that one agency could push
the ISAB in a political direction.
A second characteristic that helps ensure the ISAB's independence is
the way in which the two agencies choose the board's members. The
124. The board's structure and operations are specified in two documents. See Northwest Power
Planning Council & National Marine Fisheries Serv., Agreement Regarding the Independent
Scientific Advisory Board (1996) [hereinafter Agreement Regarding the Independent Scientific
Advisory Board]; Northwest Power Planning Council & National Marine Fisheries Serv.,
Independent Scientific Advisory BoardTerms ofReference (1996).
125. See Agreement Regardingthe Independent Scientific Advisory Board supranote 124, at 2.
126. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994) (protection of ecosystems); see also Palila v. Hawaii Dep't
of Land & Natural Resources, 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986) (land); D. Tarlock, The
EndangeredSpecies Act and Western Water Rights, 20 Land & Water L. Rev. 1 (1985).
127. See Northwest Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h) (1994).
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Fisheries Service and the Council took pains to insulate the process of
selecting the board's membership. Any party in the region can nominate
a scientist to serve on the science board.'28 However, nominations go to a
selection committee composed of independent scientists.'29 The
committee works with a National Research Council staff officer and a
nonvoting scientist from each of the two sponsoring agencies. The heads
of the two sponsoring agencies make the final choice of members, but
from a pool recommended by the selection committee. 3 Thus, .while
policy makers ultimately chose the science board members, the
involvement of outside scientists helps to ensure that the board's
membership is drawn from credible scientists.
A further protection of the board's independence is its ability to
influence its own work plan. The board will consider only those
questions it finds to be amenable to scientific analysis, and it may
undertake work on its own motion.'' The work plan must also take into
account questions posed by the two sponsoring agencies, but questions
cannot be dictated solely by the agencies.
When the board was first created, the independent selection committee
suggested that members be drawn largely from the Upstream and Return
to the River panels, ensuring that members included independent
scientists who were already engaged in the Columbia River issues. The
initial ISAB, then, represented not just a valuable pool of talent, but
talent with a collective sense of what they were about. How well this
shared perspective will carry beyond the initial membership remains to
be seen.
The role of independent science expanded soon after the creation of
the ISAB. Return to the River argues for independent scientific review of
annual fish and wildlife funding decisions.' The Bonneville Power
Administration currently spends about $100 million a year on habitat,
artificial production, research, monitoring, and other measures to
implement the Council program.'
When Bonneville makes these
funding decisions, it seeks recommendations from fish and wildlife
managers and tribes, which in many cases stand to benefit from funding
128. See Agreement Regardingthe Independent ScientificAdvisory Board,supra note 124, at 2-3.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 4.
132. See Return to the River,supra note 11, at44.
133. See White Paper: What is BPA SpendingforFishand Wildlife?, supranote 84.
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awards.'34 Return to the River

argues that these projects should also be

subject to "credible scientific review."' 3s
In 1996, Congress amended the Northwest Power Act to call for this
review of funding decisions.'36 The 1996 amendments require the
National Academy of Sciences to provide the Power Planning Council
with nominations of scientists to constitute an "Independent Scientific
Review Panel." The review panel is charged with annually evaluating
proposals for Bonneville funding to determine whether they (1) are
consistent with the Council's fish and wildlife program, (2) are based on
"sound science principles," (3) help fish and wildlife, and (4) have
137
clearly defined objectives and monitoring and evaluation provisions.
The review panel submits its recommendations to the Council, which
makes them available to the public for comment. 3 After hearing from
the public, the Council makes final funding recommendations to
Bonneville. 39 The Council is not bound by the science panel's
recommendations, and must consider additional factors, including costeffectiveness and effects of ocean conditions. However, the Council must
explain in writing if it does not accept any of the review panel's
recommendations. To promote consistency between the new science
panel and the ISAB and to avoid a proliferation of scientific boards, the
Council appointed the review panel largely from the ISAB's
membership.
The ISAB and the independent scientific review panel constitute a
powerful new scientific influence in the Columbia River conservation
effort. The two panels tend to bring a broad ecological perspective to
their work, and there is little question that this perspective is changing
the tenor of the Columbia River debate. The panels push policy toward
an ecosystem model of species conservation at the programmatic level
and in the arena of funding. They also can act as institutional advocates
for scientific methods.

134. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-782, at 104 (1996).
135. Return to the River, supra note 11, at 44.
136. See Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-206, § 512
(1996) (amending § 4(h)(10) of the Northwest Power Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 839b(h)(10) (West Supp.
1998)).
137. 16 U.S.C.A. § 839b(h)(10)(D)(iv) (West Supp. 1998).
138. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 839b(h)(10)(D)(v) (West Supp. 1998).
139. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 839b(h)(10)(D)(iv).
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This infusion of independent science has also generated new issues

and predictable friction. There is concern over the fact that only the
federal government (through the Fisheries Service) and the states

(through the Power Planning Council) formally interact with the science
boards while Indian tribes do not." The tribes play key roles in
Columbia River fish and wildlife policy, and in other aspects of the

Columbia River governance debate their involvement is deemed
essential."4 ' While the Council and the Fisheries Service want to address

this problem, it is easier to describe than it is to solve. 42 Knowing that
independent science boards are likely to say inconvenient things, tribes
have to ask themselves whether they want to join in sponsoring the

boards, or whether they are better off maintaining their distance from a
process they cannot control. Tribes also have difficulty designating

someone to represent all thirteen tribes jointly in these matters. Yet the
lack of tribal participation has real disadvantages. Unless they can find

an effective means of participation, the tribes lack influence in a vital
area. Conversely, the Fisheries Service and the Council will feed the
tribes' mistrust unless they can offer the tribes a meaningful opportunity
to join in co-sponsoring the science boards. 4 3

A different source of concern arises from a growing load of scientific
review assignments that stem from congressional requests for help in
sorting out other tangled issues. In 1997 and 1998, the requests involved
artificial production programs and several additional federal budget
categories.'" These matters require congressional appropriations and
140. See Letter from John Etchart to William Stelle, Jr., Regional Director, National Marine
Fisheries Serv. (Dec. 14, 1998).
141. See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement for the Columbia Basin Forum, signed by several
Northwest states, federal agencies, and tribes on January 29, 1999.
142. See id.
143. Four tribes sued the Council for funding decisions arising from the recommendations of the
first independent scientific review in 1997. See Petition for Review Under the Northwest Power Act,
Nez Perce Tribe v. Northwest Power Planning Council (9th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-71267); Petition for
Review Under the Northwest Power Act, Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation v.
Northwest Power Planning Council (9th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-71268); Petition for Review Under the
Northwest Power Act, Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Northwest
Power Planning Council (9th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-71269); Petition for Review Under the Northwest
Power Act, Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Northwest Power Planning
Council (9th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-71267).
144. See Committee on Appropriations, Report on Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Bill, 1998, S. Rep. No. 105-44, at 117-18 (1997) (artificial production review)
(conference report to accompany S. 1004) [hereinafter S. Rep. 105-44]; Making Appropriationsfor
Energy and Water Developmentfor the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1998 and for Other
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raise some of the same issues that are involved in the basin's annual
funding reviews.1 45 These expanded reviews make perfect sense,
enlarging the scope of scientific review and closely aligning regional and
congressional funding. But the limited membership of the scientific
boards is stretched thin with the growing work.
There is also concern that proliferating scientific reviews reflect
expectations that are unlikely to be met. Policy makers want to know
whether proposed initiatives will work. Reports like Return to the River
offer useful critiques of policy, but may imply that an omniscient science
is ready to prescribe the real solutions. However, science often uncovers
deeper mysteries rather than solutions, so scientists tend to give
qualified, probabilistic responses, or answers that do not satisfy the
political impulses that prompted the original question.
For example, one of the contentious questions in the Columbia region
concerns funding for structural improvements to protect fish trying to
pass dams. These are big-ticket investments-bypass systems, surface
skimmers, and other big, complex technologies-and different strategies
are being implemented at different dams because each dam poses unique
problems. In making appropriations, Congress is faced with doling out
limited funds, and regional interests routinely disagree over what type of
improvement is suitable at a given dam and which improvements are
more important than others. Each party brings its own scientific
arguments and Congress, understandably, looks for qualified authorities
to sort out the claims. More than that, Congress wants to know that these
improvements make sense in the big picture. Congress wants to know the
overall strategy at which these multiple paths are aimed. These concerns
prompted Congress to ask the Northwest Power Planning Council and
the independent scientific advisory board to review major fish mitigation
capital construction activities.146
In a recent report responding to Congress's request, the ISAB
suggested that structural improvements at dams should be evaluated in
light of a test of biological effectiveness that evaluates the extent to
Purposes,H.R. Rep. No. 105-271, at 29 (1997) (capital review) (conference report to accompany
H.R. 2203) [hereinafter H.R. Rep. 105-271).
145. See S.Rep. 105-44, supranote 144, at 117-18; H.R. Rep. 105-271, supra note 144, at 29.
146. "The conference agreement includes $95,000,000 for the Columbia River Juvenile Fish
Mitigation program in Washington, Oregon, and Idaho instead of $85,000,000 as proposed by the
House and $117,000,000 as proposed by the Senate. The conferees note that the budget request for
this program appeared to reflect the pursuit of multiple restoration strategies. Some of these may not
be adopted, rendering expensive measures obsolete." H.. Rep. 105-27 1, supranote 144, at 29.
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which improvements enhance "conditions essential to the life history of
the species."" The ISAB said that while this test should drive decisions
on dam improvements, it rarely did.'48 At the same time, according to the
ISAB, some of the multiple strategies that are working the best on the
river were arrived at not through design, but by observation and trial and
error. 49 An ice and trash sluiceway that was not intended for fish passage
turns out to be more effective than many systems designed for fish
passage.' One of the more promising technologies-surface bypass-is
modeled on a hydrocombine at Wells Dam that was not designed for its
fish passage qualities.' The fact that Basin conservation efforts have not
settled on a single, standardized technology, but have implemented
whatever works, has led to broader protection of more diverse
populations.' In a sense, the ISAB can be read as an endorsement of a
skeptical, empirical approach to the problem of dam modifications.
The science board's response makes good sense from an ecological
perspective. It reflects the principles of Upstream and Return to the River
and underscores the theme of managing for uncertainty. However, for
those looking for consensus on a logical funding path and a way to avoid
false starts and minimize redundancy, the report offers something quite
different. It points to the need to continue experimentation with diverse
methods, to protect more populations, to anticipate that some efforts will
fail, and to anticipate the usual disorder that characterizes humans
groping for solutions.
These communications between scientists and policy makers can
frustrate both sides. Policy makers may not get the answers they expect,
and scientists may put energy into answers that they come to feel are
discarded for political reasons. In the end, however, the relationship will
persist because it has to persist. Conservation policy cannot be effective
if it lacks scientific strength, and scientific advice cannot be meaningful
if it has no purchase in policy arenas. This mutuality does not disappear

147. Independent Scientific Advisory Bd. et al., ISAB Rep. 99-4, Review ofthe U.S. Army Corps
ofEngineers' CapitalConstructionProgrampt. III at 13 (1999).
148. See a at 4-5.
149. See Northwest Power Planning Council, Review of the Corps ofEngineers' Columbia River
FishMigrationProgram 10-11 (1999).
150. See id
151. See id.

152. See id
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in the wake of frustrations, as difficult as the blunt talk that passes back
and forth may be.
At the same time, it bears emphasis that joint science boards do not
dispel the uncertainties that surround species conservation issues. They
necessarily leave the onus of judgment on political institutions, which is
appropriate. On major resource issues, even the best scientists deal more
with hypothesis than fact. Because of this, the basic caution of adaptive
management to anticipate surprise is equally applicable to the advice of
science boards. Contemporary scientists may have a vision that offers
important clues to species recovery. But ten or twenty years from now
we will know more and our vision will be different. Skepticism is
therefore equally applicable to the advice of science boards, and the
boards themselves should be guarantors that their assumptions will be
ruthlessly tested.
4.

Ecosystem Policy and the FrameworkProject

The authors of Return to the River and other reviewing scientists
report that evaluation of the Columbia River conservation program is
almost impossible because these efforts have no coherent conceptual
foundation, only a collection of different management objectives and
scientific assumptions.' One of the first indications of this problem
emerged in the late 1980s, when the Northwest Power Planning Council
asked a panel of independent scientists how the Council could evaluate
progress under the Council's fish and wildlife program. The scientists'
response was, in effect: "Progress toward what?" To the scientists, the
Council's program looked like a miscellaneous collection of recovery
and mitigation measures, each with different scientific assumptions and
management objectives.' 54 To a certain extent, this problem is rooted in
the Northwest Power Act, which requires the Council's fish and wildlife
program to be based on the recommendations of fish and wildlife
managers. But whatever the source of the problem, the independent
scientists maintained that the program could not be evaluated unless it
was based on an explicit, integrating framework-a system of goals,
objectives, and scientific logic to link aims and actions.' 5

153. See Bonneville Power Admin. Scientific Review Group, Critical Uncertainties in the Fish
and Wildlife Program 13-14 (1993).
154. See id.
155. See id.
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The Columbia Basin has made relatively good progress in collecting
and systematizing data,'56 but much less progress in establishing
benchmarks to measure progress for fish and wildlife policy. There are
many practical reasons for the problem. The river has always been pulled
in many different directions at once."5 7 Historically, there has been only
episodic agreement on priorities, and the river has many different forums
in which policies are weighed using different scales of value. 8 The lack
of incentives for self-evaluation in fish and wildlife policy and the
absence of an institution with the political or legal muscle to hold
management programs to account have made it difficult to evaluate
progress."5 9 But the problem is not just practical, it is also conceptual.
Although no one disagrees that effects in one part of the ecosystem
cannot be understood in isolation from the rest of the system, there is no
overall framework in which to connect the parts. Without understanding
how these connections work in the aggregate, it is difficult to organize or
evaluate a large recovery program.
Return to the River addresses the lack of a conceptual foundation and
offers a three-part conceptual foundation for fish and wildlife policy in
the Columbia region. First, Return to the River says that it is a mistake to
think about fish and wildlife in pieces." ° There are no individual habitat,
hydropower, hatchery, and harvest problems. Salmon populate
ecosystems that include rivers, estuaries, and an ocean, which are
interdependent. 6' More than that, salmon ecosystems are populated by a
large variety of organisms that need to be present if salmon are going to
be healthy. 62 Second, strong fish and wildlife populations need many

156. An aquatic resource information center called StreamNet, funded with federal hydropower
revenues, has gathered and made accessible an immense body of data on fish and wildlife abundance
and distribution and on an array of habitat, harvest, and mitigation efforts. See The Northwest Info.
Network (last modified July 12, 1999) <http://www.streamnet.org>. See also, e.g., Duane Anderson
et al., Report on the Status of Salmon and Steelhead in the Columbia River Basin-1995 (last
modified April 1996) <http://www.streamnet.org/Reports/crstat95.htm> (reporting on status of
Columbia River salmon runs).
157. See generally John M. Volkman, A River in Common: The Columbia River the Salmon
Ecosystem, and Water Policy (1997).
158. See John M. Volkman, The Law of the Columbia River, in Competing for the Mighty
Columbia-Past,Present and Future:The Role ofinterstateAllocation 22-23 (1998).
159. See Volkman & McConnaha, supra note 79, at 1261, 1271.
160. See Return to the River, supra note 11, at 18.
161. Seeid. at 20-25.
162. See id. at 20-21; Independent Scientific Group, Return to the River: An Ecological Vision
for the Recovery ofthe Columbia River Salmon, 28 Envtl. L. 503, 509 (1998).
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healthy habitats that are linked rather than isolated.'63 Without connected
habitats, salmon lack the spawning areas, migration conditions, and food
webs they need. Third, the structure of fish and wildlife populations
needs to guide recovery policy. In particular, diverse life histories, 64
genetic diversity, and metapopulation organization are crucial ways in
which salmon adapt to their environment. 65 Unless fish and wildlife
recovery builds from these foundations, the report implied, wild salmon
and other species would not persist over the long term."6 Scientific
questions can be asked about this vision, but the harder problem is
political. What does a large basin filled with contending parties and
agencies do with such a vision? How do disparate entities find consensus
on something as broad as an ecological vision?
To address the need for an explicit vision for the Columbia River
conservation effort, federal, state, and tribal governments together have
formed a process called the Framework Project. 67 The project aims to
involve policy makers, scientists, and other parties in articulating and
analyzing alternative visions using an explicit set of ecological
assumptions, theories, and principles. The resulting analysis is intended
to provide a common frame of reference for a spectrum of decisions,
including federal agency decisions, the Northwest Power Planning
Council's decisions, and others. The project participants implicitly
acknowledge that a framework requires a balance between policy and
science. An integrated program for the Columbia River and its species
can emerge only from policy judgments representing both a social and a
scientific vision of the river's ecological, cultural, and economic
functions. 6 ' The ecological element is supplied by a scientific foundation
that is drawn largely from Upstream, Return to the River, and the
scientific work of the Interior Columbia Basin Ecosystem Management
Project. 6 9 This foundation provides a logical sequence for evaluating the
163. See Return to the River, supra note 11, at 22-23.
164. A life history is an expression of the time a young salmon emerges from its egg, begins to
migrate downstream, returns to spawn, and other characteristics.
165. See Return to the River, supra note 11, at xvi-xvii.
166. See id at 33.
167. See Multi-Species Framework, Columbia River Basin Multi-Species Framework: Helping
Define the Futureofthe Columbia River 1 [hereinafter Helping Define the Future].
168. See id.
169. See IntegratedScientific Assessment for Ecosystem Management in the Interior Columbia
Basin. and Portions of the Klamath and Great Basins (Thomas M. Quigly et al. eds., 1996)
(prepared as part of Interior Columbia Basin Ecosystem Management Project).
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ecological implications of different courses of action. 7 ' Social, political,
and other considerations are supplied by a group of government entities
and stakeholders who identify alternative fish and wildlife management
approaches that are more or less protective of other interests in the
river. 7' Project analysts evaluate these policy alternatives in light of the
scientific foundation. The process is recursive: a first round of analysis
goes back to the policy group, that group revises the alternatives in
response to the analysis, and the alternatives then go back to the analysts
for further evaluation. 2 The final analysis will inform federal, regional,
and other decisions regarding Columbia River policy." Ideally, the
analysis will give the parties glimpses of a broad, long-term vision for
the river, a chance to consider the overlapping needs of many species,
and a way to assess ecological and human stakes over the long term.
How far the framework process actually moves the Columbia debate
remains to be seen. But even if the project does not lead the contending
parties to a single vision, it will have begun to shift the parties' thinking
toward a broader ecosystem whose parts connect.
C.

Adaptive Management and the ContinuingDialogueBetween
Scientists, PolicyMakers, and the Governed

In developed ecosystems, policy makers will always face complex
decisions involving human factors that are legally protected, as well as
ecology, economics, politics, and ethics. Policy makers need scientific
information to make these decisions, but science does not dictate the
ultimate judgments."14
The Framework Project, PATH, and other methods in the Columbia
River effort illustrate the interactions that need to occur between policy
makers and scientists to make sensible species conservation policy. Only
through such interactions can we decide how far the Basin should move
from technological methods to more natural, "normative" conditions.
Even if there were consensus that moving toward a river with more
ecological function is desirable, broader judgments will need to be made
170. See Ecological Work Group, An Ecological Frameworkfor the Multi-Species Planning
Process(1998).
171. See Helping Define the Future,supra note 167, at 1-2.
172. See id. at2.
173. See i& at 3.
174. See William Stelle, Jr., Overcoming the Seven Myths of Columbia River Salmon Recovery,
28 Envtl. L. 493,499 (1998).
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about the habitats that we should restore and reconnect, the technologies
that we should discard or keep, and who should pay for the effort.
Scientific insights will shape these decisions, especially insights into
the population structure of key species. For example, the metapopulation
concept of Upstream and Return to the River contemplates the Hanford
Reach fall chinook population as being the seed for an enlarged core
population, connecting with tributary populations like those in the
Yakima, Umatilla, and John Day Rivers. But the policy issues implicit in
this idea are significant. Are fall chinook, with their associated species
communities and ecological processes, the right focus for conservation
planning? If so, are we willing to lower the levels of reservoirs adjacent
to the Hanford Reach or even remove some of those projects? How
would we address their important role in the energy system and the
complications that lower reservoirs might create for navigation? What of
the lower reaches of the Yakima, Umatilla, and John Day Rivers and
other major tributaries? Would human uses change there to
accommodate ecological rehabilitation? How far are we willing to go to
test these ideas? Would we be better off to leave the river largely as it is,
forget the idea of expanding core populations, and run ecological risks
with tributary populations, expanded hatchery programs, and other
technologies? While all of these are policy judgments, they will stand up
only if scientific knowledge infuses them and the best scientific methods
test them.
A central assumption in the Columbia River effort is the idea that
adaptive management can structure the dialogue between policy and
science. Yet, it is hard to quarrel with Carl Walter's observation that
"[e]xperimental management planning has floundered in complex
institutional settings like the... Columbia River."' 5 This is not to say
that experimental management is a failed enterprise in the Columbia
Region. Adaptive management has spurred the development of learning
tools because it draws attention to what we do not know and raises
questions about how we can find out. Posing these awkward questions in
the Columbia River effort, adaptive management has shaped policy by
generating initiatives in applied research, collaborative modeling,
independent scientific advice, and ecological synthesis. However, the
Columbia River effort has not demonstrated a willingness or ability to
use large-scale experiments systematically to probe uncertainties. The

175. Walters, supra note 83, at 12.
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potential human effects of experimentation have limited the learning in
the Columbia to smaller, less risky, and less-penetrating exercises.
There are benefits to the Columbia River effort's diverse and lessorganized collection of learning tools. When no one has all the answers,
large management experiments may simply be too risky. Investigating
problems in different ways from several directions may be a better way
to test diverse and obscure ecological problems. While they may be
unable to manage large experiments, communities with limited resources
that are dealing with emerging conservation problems may find that a
variety of learning tools is more useful. They can compensate for the
limitations of these smaller tools by tapping into existing efforts, such as
the independent science boards like ISAB, large-scale scientific
syntheses like Upstream and Return to the River, and extensive
collaborative modeling processes like PATH. These existing efforts will
also lead communities toward broader ecological considerations. If
established on sound foundations, smaller, varied learning tools can lay
the groundwork for disparate parties to collaborate.
But without systematic experimentation, these learning tools may
come up short. In an ecosystem like the Columbia River, scientists have
to make sense of the critical variables in a sprawling ecosystem. By
aiming at narrower phenomena, we may attribute problems to the wrong
causes, or focus too much attention in some areas and not enough in
others. There is always the risk that fish and wildlife populations will die
off before we find answers. Developing more powerful, penetrating ways
to experiment with ecosystems is a puzzle the Columbia effort has yet to
solve.
Finding these solutions may hinge less on scientific insight and clearheaded government institutions than on social will. The difficult equation
underlying species conservation policy is the potential sacrifice humans
may have to make for ecosystem recovery. This equation is not one
governments alone can solve. Even if contending government institutions
see ways to conserve species, many critical parts of the ecosystem are
privately owned. In a system of government premised on consent of the
governed, the divisiveness of species conservation issues can paralyze
political discourse and stall experimentation.
These divisions are not impossible to bridge. The harsh specter of
species extinctions and deepening policy stalemate will take a mounting
toll that few people will willingly pay. Most people will concede that a
river mired in long-term conflict over vanishing species is not what they
want to leave to their grandchildren. Faced with this prospect, even
people who disagree over species conservation issues in the short term
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may find it possible to see a common future in the long term. Science is
giving Columbia River parties a glimpse of roads they could follow.
Getting from here to there will involve experimentation with tools very
like those of adaptive management.
IV. CONCLUSION
If communities are to create viable species conservation programs,
they must appreciate the extent to which uncertainty determines what can
be achieved. The Columbia River conservation efforts teach important
lessons in managing uncertainty, and provide learning tools that other
communities can use as they address species conservation issues. The
impulse to learn remains one of the most compelling aspects of
Columbia River conservation policy.
From the point of view of those interested in a vibrant federalism, it is
particularly important that the relationship between scientists, policy
makers, and communities work. If the Federal government, states, tribes,
and other parties share common scientific assumptions, they can defuse
misunderstandings that would otherwise undermine progress in
conservation. Endangered Species Act listings, in particular, put
powerful levers of resource policy in federal hands, and may threaten to
eclipse regional, state, and tribal policy. The resulting tensions are
politically combustible and can consume contending jurisdictions and
other parties in arguments that sap political energy and leave scars. By
developing a joint understanding among federal, state, tribal, and local
interests, science can help create a common language for collaboration.
Finally, the Columbia River efforts demonstrate this: decisions about
species conservation in developed ecosystems are ultimately exercises in
cultural evolution.'7 6 We are slowly learning how to understand our
effects on the world and considering whether to change our behavior to
sustain the environment on which we have depended. Evolution of this
kind is inevitably fitful and our hesitant attempts at experimentation may
seem feeble. But whether we continue to learn and adapt may determine
our own success as a species.

176. See McEvoy, supra note 66, at 16.

